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MIRANDA'S POISONED FRUIT TREE:
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF PHYSICAL EVIDENCE
DERIVED FROM AN UNWARNED STATEMENT
Kirsten Lela Ambach
Abstract: Miranda v. Arizona created an exclusionary rule that prohibits using, as part of
the prosecution's case in chief, evidence that is obtained as the result of unwarned custodial
interrogation. In Michigan v. Tucker and Oregon v. Elstad,the United States Supreme Court
narrowed the scope of this rule in relation to the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine that
excludes all evidence derived from constitutional violations. The Tucker Court held that the
testimony of a witness identified from an unwarned statement should be admitted, and the
Elstad Court held that a warned statement following an unwarned statement should also be
admitted. In both cases, the primary rationale for the exceptions was the prophylactic status
of the Miranda rule. This status distinguished Miranda violations from constitutional
violations to which the fruits doctrine was applicable. In 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court
reversed its earlier characterization of Miranda as a prophylactic rule, and instead reaffirmed
the rule's constitutional status in Dickerson v. United States. After Dickerson, a circuit split
developed regarding the admissibility of physical evidence derived from unwamed
statements excluded at trial. This Comment argues that the U.S. Supreme Court should hold
that both the unwarned statement and its derivative physical evidence should be excluded
from the prosecution's case in chief. Fifth Amendment precedent mandates applying the
fruits doctrine to physical evidence derived from an unwared statement in order to
effectively deter violations of Miranda and to ensure the trustworthiness of evidence
obtained in the interrogation setting.

In 1966, Miranda v. Arizona' dramatically changed the face of
custodial interrogation. 2 The United States Supreme Court held that
incommunicado 3 custodial surroundings and contemporary interrogation
techniques 4 are inherently compelling and in violation of the Fifth
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 22.01 (3d ed. 2002).
3. "Incommunicado" interrogations are done in a setting that isolates the suspect from anyone and
anything familiar in order to deprive the suspect of every psychological advantage and bestow such
advantages on the interrogators. See Miranda,384 U.S. at 449-50.
4. See id. at 467. By the 1960s, police conducting interrogations had largely adopted and used
psychological tactics rather than physical abuse. See id. at 448-49. The Miranda Court focused on
the psychological methods described in two criminal interrogation manuals. Id. at 449-54 (citing
INBAU & REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (1962); O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS

OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION (1956)). Psychological pressures were more difficult to prove than
physical abuse when the voluntariness of the defendant's confession was in question. The Court
concluded that police were exploiting the incommunicado nature of custodial interrogation in order
to destabilize the suspect by focusing on his insecurities about himself or his surroundings. Once the
suspect was off balance, the police used patience, persistence, and trickery to inhibit the defendant
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Amendment. 5 This inherent compulsion can be dispelled only by the
police explicitly informing the suspect of his or her rights, 6 known as the
Miranda warnings, 7 and the suspect's voluntary and knowing waiver of
those rights. 8 The Miranda decision established the broad, presumptive
exclusionary rule 9 that "no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation

can be used against" the defendant unless the prosecution demonstrates
at trial that the warnings were given and the defendant's waiver was
voluntary and knowing.' ° However, the Court did not clarify whether
"no evidence" was limited to the defendant's statement, or extended to
evidence derived from that statement as well. The Court has since carved
out three exceptions to Miranda'ssweep.II
A separate but related doctrine in the context of exclusion of evidence
is the "fruit of the poisonous tree"' 2 doctrine (fruits doctrine). The fruits
doctrine generally forbids the prosecution from using either

from exercising his constitutional rights. See id. at 455.
5. See id. at 467.
6. See id. at 444-45.
7. An in-custody suspect:
must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he
says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an
attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires.
Id. at 479.
8. See id. at 444-45.
9. See id. at 476.
10. See id. at 479.
11.See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 314 (1985) (creating the cured statement exception);
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 (1984) (creating the public safety exception); Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447-48 (1974) (creating the limited retroactivity exception). The cured
statement exception requires courts to exclude an unwarned statement but admit a subsequent
statement if Miranda warnings were administered and the suspect knowingly waived those rights
before the later statement was made. See Elstad,470 U.S. at 314. Under the public safety exception,
courts may admit both the defendant's statement and any evidence derived from that statement
when Miranda is violated for public safety concerns. See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 655. Finally, in the
limited retroactivity exception, courts must exclude an unwarned statement but may admit the
testimony of a witness identified through that statement if the statement was obtained prior to the
Miranda decision and the trial occurred afterwards. See Tucker, 417 U.S. at 447-48. The Court has
also established an impeachment exception whereby an otherwise inadmissible unwarned statement
is admissible to attack the credibility of the defendant's trial testimony. See Harris v. New York,
401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971). However, this exception is beyond the scope of this Comment because it
still does not allow the evidence into the prosecution's case in chief. Another possible exception to
Miranda is the independent source doctrine. So far, however, this doctrine has only been applied
within the Fifth Amendment context to immunity, not interrogation, and therefore it is also beyond
the scope of this Comment. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,460 (1972).
12. See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).

Miranda's Poisoned Fruit Tree
unconstitutionally obtained primary evidence or its derivative evidence

in its case in chief. 3 Primary evidence is the direct product of police
action violative of the constitution, 14 such as an illegally seized bag or an
unwarned statement. Derivative evidence is the indirect product of
police action.' 5 The police obtain or become aware of derivative
evidence through primary evidence.'

6

Examples of derivative evidence

include testimony by a non-party witness whose identity was revealed in
the unwarned statement, a defendant's subsequent statement, or drugs
located through an unwarned statement.' 7 Generally, an exclusionary
rule presumptively applies to the primary evidence.' 8 The fruits doctrine,
or the practice of excluding the derivative evidence as well, is an

additional safety measure to ensure that the prosecution does not profit
from an unconstitutional act.' 9 Unless the prosecution proves by a
preponderance of the evidence that an exception to the fruits doctrine
applies, the derivative evidence is excluded.2 °
The U.S. Supreme Court first extended the general exclusionary rule
to derivative evidence, thereby creating the fruits doctrine in the Fourth
Amendment context.2' In Wong Sun v. United States,22 the Court held

13. In the Fourth Amendment context, see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487 (1963),
Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939), and Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,
251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). In the Fifth Amendment context, see Murphy v. Waterfront Commission,
378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964). In the Sixth Amendment context, see United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,
235 (1967).
14. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See United States v. Faulkingham, 295 F.3d 85, 91 (1st Cir. 2002).
18. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966); Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484. The general
exclusionary rule for a Fifth Amendment violation is not merely a remedy for a constitutional right;
it is inherent in the right itself. See DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 23.02[E][1]. The Fifth Amendment
provides that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
U.S. CONST. amend. V. In other words, if the evidence is in any way linked to self-incrimination, it
is inadmissible in the prosecution's case in chief. When Miranda found custodial interrogation
inherently compulsive, it extended the Fifth Amendment's exclusionary rule to custodial, unwamed
statements. See Miranda,384 U.S. at 458.
19. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,443 (1984); see also Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 486.
20. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 444.
21. See Silverthome Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (finding that "[tihe
essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely
evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at al')
(emphasis added).
22. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
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that evidence "come at by exploitation" 23 of an unconstitutional act ("the
poisonous tree" 24) is inadmissible derivative evidence ("the tainted
fruit '25 of the tree). 26 The fruits doctrine applies unless the connection
between the Fourth Amendment violation and the derivative evidence is
too attenuated.27 The passage of time and a break in events are two
factors relevant to determining whether the fruits doctrine applies in the
Fourth Amendment.28 While the fruits doctrine was first developed
under the Fourth Amendment context, 29 the U.S. Supreme Court has also
applied it in the context of the Fifth 30 and Sixth Amendments. 31 For
example, in the Fifth Amendment context, the Court has held that courts
can compel a state witness to offer incriminating testimony only if both
the compelled testimony and the evidence derived from that testimony
are inadmissible in a criminal prosecution against the witness.32
In Dickerson v. United States,33 the U.S. Supreme Court clarified the
status of Miranda'srule, which requires the administration of warnings
and an effective waiver prior to admitting the statement in the
prosecution's case in chief, as a constitutional rule under the Fifth
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. 34 The Dickerson
Court held that Miranda's strictures on the admissibility of statements
made during custodial interrogation are constitutional, not
prophylactic. 35 Notably, the exceptions to Miranda survived
Dickerson,36 despite their primary reliance on Miranda's former
prophylactic status.37 The Court distinguished them on the ground that

23. See id. at 488 (internal quotes omitted).
24. See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
25. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 441.
26. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488.
27. See Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341.
28. See id.
29. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
30. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964).
31. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 235-36 (1967).
32. See Murphy, 378 U.S. at 79.
33. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
34. See id. at 437-38.
35. See id. at 444. A prophylactic rule is formulated to prevent something. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1234 (7th ed. 1999).
36. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441.
37. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446
(1974).

Miranda'sPoisoned Fruit Tree
"no constitutional rule is immutable., 38 The Court recognized that
constitutional rules can be modified to have exceptions because courts
are unable39 to foresee all applications of a rule at the time of the original
decision.

Since the Dickerson decision, a circuit split has developed regarding
the admissibility of physical evidence derived from unwarned statements
excluded at trial.40 The crux of the split lies in the circuit courts'
interpretations of the impact of Miranda's warnings and waiver as a
constitutional right, and not merely a prophylactic safeguard, on two of
Miranda's progeny involving derivative evidence. 41 Two circuits have
held that the fruits doctrine does not apply to derivative physical
evidence.42 Conversely, two other circuits have held that the fruits
doctrine does apply to Miranda violations.43 The U.S. Supreme Court
recently granted certiorari to United States v. Patane,4 and therefore this
issue will soon be resolved.
This Comment argues that the U.S. Supreme Court should hold that,
absent an exception, both the unwarned statement and its derivative
physical evidence should be excluded when Miranda rights are
violated.45 Part I explores the scope of Miranda's exclusionary rule.
Part II discusses the impact of Dickerson's reaffirmation of Miranda's
constitutional status on the scope of Miranda's exclusionary rule.
Part III reviews the post-Dickerson lower federal court split on the
application of the fruits doctrine to derivative physical evidence. Part IV
argues that the U.S. Supreme Court should hold that the fruits doctrine
38. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441.
39. See id.
40. See United States v. Patane, 304 F.3d 1013, 1029 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. granted,71 U.S.L.W.
3530 (U.S. Apr. 21, 2003) (No. 02-1183) (excluding gun derived from a statement negligently
obtained in violation of Miranda); United States v. Faulkingham, 295 F.3d 85, 93-94 (1st Cir.
2002) (admitting statements of a witness and drugs derived from a statement negligently obtained in
violation of Miranda); United States v. Sterling, 283 F.3d 216, 219 (4th Cir. 2002) (admitting gun
derived from an unwamed statement); United States v. DeSumma, 272 F.3d 176, 180-81 (3d Cir.
2001) (admitting gun derived from an unwarned statement).
41. See Patane, 304 F.3d at 1025; Faulkingham, 295 F.3d at 93; Sterling, 283 F.3d at 219;
DeSumma, 272 F.3d at 180.
42. See Sterling, 283 F.3d at 219; DeSumma, 272 F.3d at 180.
43. See Patane,304 F.3d at 1029; Faulkingham, 295 F.3d at 90.
44. See United States v. Patane, 71 U.S.L.W. 3530 (U.S. Apr. 21, 2003) (No. 02-1183).
45. This Comment is limited in scope to the admissibility of physical fruits of unwarned
statements. The current state of other forms of derivative evidence, namely witness identification
and defendants' statements, is beyond this Comment's scope-except as they pertain to an
established exception to Miranda's exclusionary rule.
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applied to physical evidence derived from

MIRANDA'S EXCLUSIONARY RULE

In Miranda v. Arizona, the U.S. Supreme Court created a default
exclusionary rule: courts cannot admit evidence obtained prior to the
suspect being given Miranda warnings and making a voluntary and
knowing waiver of those rights to prove the prosecution's case in chief
at trial.47 The Miranda Court did not address the applicability of the
fruits doctrine,48 which mandates exclusion of all evidence derived from
a constitutional violation, absent an established exception.49 Yet in
subsequent cases, the Court restricted the scope of Miranda's
exclusionary rule by carving out three exceptions to its presumption of
inadmissibility. 50 First, the public safety exception allows the
prosecution to use both the unwarned statement and its fruits in the
prosecution's case in chief.5' The second and third exceptions are
derivative evidence exceptions, requiring courts to exclude the unwarned
statement but admit its fruits. 52 The Court has not explicitly ruled on
whether an exception exists for physical evidence derived from an
unwarned statement excluded at trial,53 although some Justices have
expressed opinions on the issue.54

46. Unless an established exception applies. See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 314 (1985)
(applying a cured statement exception); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 (1984) (applying a
public safety exception); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447-48 (1974) (applying the limited
retroactivity exception).
47. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
48. See Tucker, 417 U.S. at 447, 452 n.26.
49. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963); Silverthome Lumber Co. v. United
States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
50. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314; Quarles, 467 U.S. at 655; Tucker, 417 U.S. at 448. This
Comment is limited in scope to exceptions to the exclusion of evidence in the prosecution's case in
chief. See supra note 11.
5 1. See Quarles,467 U.S. at 655.
52. See Elstad,470 U.S. at 318; Tucker, 417 U.S. at 448.
53. See Patterson v. United States, 485 U.S. 922, 922-23 (1988) (White, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari); United States v. Patane, 304 F.3d 1013, 1023 (10th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Faulkingham, 295 F.3d 85, 90-91 (1st Cir. 2002).
54. See, e.g., Quarles,467 U.S. at 666 (O'Connor J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id.
at 688 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

Miranda'sPoisoned Fruit Tree
A.

The Scope of Miranda's Exclusionary Rule

Miranda v. Arizona governs the admissibility of evidence obtained
through custodial interrogation. 5 Miranda was one of four consolidated
cases in which the defendants had provided the police with incriminating
statements while in custody and subject to interrogation.56 While the
cases were from different jurisdictions, they had four significant facts in
common: (1) each suspect was in custody; (2) each suspect was
questioned in the police-dominated atmosphere of an interrogation room;
(3) each suspect was run through police interrogation procedures; and
(4) none of the suspects was informed of the privilege against selfincrimination. 7 The question before the Court was whether custodial
interrogation rendered the defendants' statements inadmissible as
violations of the Fifth Amendment. 58 Prior to the Miranda decision, the
admissibility of a confession was determined by a voluntariness test
inquiring whether a defendant's will was overborne. 59 This voluntariness
test was derived from two constitutional bases: the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination6 ° and the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause. 6' After reviewing police practices and interrogation
manuals, however, the Miranda Court concluded that there was an
inherent compulsion about custodial interrogation that the voluntariness
test could not safeguard.62
The Court determined that custodial surroundings and interrogation
procedures blurred the line between voluntary and involuntary
statements, thus heightening the risk that an individual's Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination would not be
protected.6 3 To alleviate this risk, the Court created a concrete set of
55. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
444-45 (1966).
56. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 456-57.

57. See id. at 445, 456-57; DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 24.04[A].
58. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445.
59. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964).
60. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
61. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See Malloy, 378 U.S. at 6-7; Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
278, 286 (1936) (holding that state courts must suppress involuntary confessions under the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause); Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43
(1897) (holding that federal courts must suppress compelled confessions under the Fifth
Amendment).
62. See Miranda,384 U.S. at 457-58.
63. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 435 (2000); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457-58.
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procedural safeguards for law enforcement agencies and courts to
follow 64 and grounded the admissibility of any statement made during
custodial interrogation upon the administration of the four Miranda
warnings and waiver of those rights. 65 The prosecution has the burden of
demonstrating that the Miranda warnings were administered and that the
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived those rights before the
court can admit the defendant's statement. 66 Thus, the Miranda Court
announced a broad exclusionary rule: "unless and until [the Miranda]
warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no
evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against [the
defendant]. 67
The Court directed that "the prosecution may not use
statements... stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant
unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to
secure the privilege against self-incrimination. 68 The Court did not
address whether this use was limited to the defendant's statements, or
whether it was more broadly meant to include the fruits doctrine, thus
prohibiting the prosecution from using derivative evidence obtained
from the unwarned statement as well. 69 The fruits doctrine arises in the
Miranda context when an unwarned statement leads to: (1) the
identification of a witness whom the prosecution seeks to use in its case
in chief,70 (2) self-incriminating statements from the defendant, 71 or (3)
information regarding the location of physical evidence.72 Thus far, the

64. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 442.
65. See id. at 444-45. The four Miranda warnings require that an in-custody suspect "be warned

prior to any questioning": (1) "that he has the right to remain silent," (2) "that anything he says can
be used against him in a court of law," (3) "that he has the right to the presence of an attorney," and
(4) "that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he
so desires." Id. at 479.
66. See id. at 444, 479.
67. See id. at 479 (emphasis added).
68. Id. at 444 (emphasis added).
69. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447, 452 n.26 (1974).
70. See id. at 436-37.
71. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 311-12 (1985).

72. See United States v. Patane, 304 F.3d 1013, 1015-16 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 71
U.S.L.W. 3530 (U.S. Apr. 21, 2003) (No. 02-1183); United States v. Faulkingham, 295 F.3d 85, 86

(1st Cir. 2002); United States v. Sterling, 283 F.3d 216, 218 (4th Cir. 2002); United States v.
DeSumma, 272 F.3d 176, 178 (3d Cir. 2001).

Miranda'sPoisoned Fruit Tree
U.S. Supreme Court has neither 73
explicitly adopted nor rejected the fruits
doctrine in the Mirandacontext.
B.

Exceptions to Miranda's Exclusionary Rule

The U.S. Supreme Court has carved out three exceptions to
Miranda's exclusionary rule. 74 First, courts can admit an unwarned
statement and its fruits when the defendant was providing information
regarding pressing public safety concerns.75 In New York v. Quarles,76
the U.S. Supreme Court determined that an unwarned statement and its
fruits are admissible when public safety would be immediately
jeopardized by any delay in obtaining the evidence.7 7 The Court held
that an unwarned statement revealing the location of a gun and the gun
itself should be admitted, even without Miranda warnings, because the
defendant had discarded the gun in a populated supermarket. 78 The Court
characterized the situation as one in which "the need for answers to
questions... outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule" protecting
the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights.79 Therefore, where public
safety is at issue, the Miranda rule does not apply and both the primary
and derivative evidence are admissible.8 °
The second exception to Miranda's exclusionary rule stems from
Michigan v. Tucker.81 In Tucker, the police gave the defendant the
warnings constitutionally required before Miranda,82 but at the time, the

73. See Patterson v. United States, 485 U.S. 922, 922-23 (1988) (White, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari); Palane, 304 F.3d at 1023; Faulkingham, 295 F.3d at 90-91.
74. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314; New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 (1984); Tucker, 417
U.S. at 447-48. These are exceptions to the exclusion of evidence from the prosecution's case in
chief. For other exceptions outside the scope of this Comment, see supra note 11.
75. See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 657.
76. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
77. See id. at 655.
78. See id. at 652.
79. See id. at 657.
80. See id. at 659-60.
81. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
82. See id. at 447 (finding that "at the time respondent was questioned these police officers were
guided, quite rightly, by the principles established in Escobedo v. Illinois") (citation omitted). The
Escobedo decision set the stage for Miranda by holding that the custodial interrogation of a suspect
without honoring the suspect's request for an attorney and not effectively warning him of his right
to remain silent or his right to consult with his attorney renders any statement elicited from him
inadmissible under the Sixth Amendment. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964).
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warnings did not include the right to free counsel.83 After waiving his
84
rights, the defendant identified Robert Henderson as an alibi witness.
Mr. Henderson, however, discredited the defendant's statement, and the
prosecution used him in its case in chief 85 After the interrogation, but
before the trial date,86 the U.S. Supreme Court announced the Miranda
rule, which included the indigent defendant's right to state-provided
counsel.87 At trial, the judge retroactively applied Miranda and excluded
the defendant's statement.8 8 The U.S. Supreme Court, however, held that
the derivative witness identification evidence should be admitted. 89
Under Tucker, the Court created a limited retroactivity exception for
witnesses identified by a defendant's statement made before Miranda
was decided, but after the defendant received the warnings required at
the time. 90 The Tucker Court rationalized admitting the derivative
evidence by characterizing Miranda as a prophylactic rule. 91 The Court
reasoned that the Miranda warnings were not a constitutionally
protected right.92 Instead, the warnings were prophylactic measures
designed to protect the privilege against self-incrimination, and the
failure to give them did not abridge the Fifth Amendment. 93 The Tucker
Court also determined that the traditional fruits doctrine does not apply
when the police do not actually infringe upon the defendant's
constitutional rights. 94 The Court distinguished Tucker from Wong Sun,
where the fruits doctrine applied 95 because a constitutional violation had
occurred. 96 Consequently, the traditional fruits doctrine requiring

83. See Tucker, 417 U.S. at 436.
84. Id.
85. Id.at 436-37.
86. See id. at 437.

87. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
88. See Tucker, 417 U.S. at 447-48; see also Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 733 (1966)
(holding that Miranda would not be applied retroactively to cases in which the trial had begun
before the decision was announced, but that it would apply retroactively to cases in which the trial
began after the date of decision).
89. See Tucker, 417 U.S. at 447-48.
90. See id. at 448.
91. See id. at 446.
92. See id. at 444.
93. See id. at 446.
94. See id.

95. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963).
96. See Tucker, 417 U.S. at 445-46.

Miranda's Poisoned Fruit Tree
exclusion of derivative
evidence was not controlling for prophylactic
97
Miranda violations.
Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court created an additional derivative
evidence exception to Miranda's exclusionary rule in Oregon v.
Elstad.98 In Elstad, the defendant implicated himself in an answer to a
police question after being arrested, but before receiving his Miranda
warnings.99 An hour later at the stationhouse, the defendant received the
Miranda warnings, waived them, and gave the police a fully
incriminating statement.' 00 The Court decided that a suspect who
responds to unwarned but non-coercive questioning does not thereby
lose the ability to waive his rights and confess after being given the
requisite Miranda warnings.10 Thus, the Court held that the defendant's
warned statement, although derived from an earlier unwarned statement,
should be admitted.10 2 Unlike a Fourth Amendment violation,'0 3
sufficient passage of time or a break in events is not required to cure the
second, derivative statement. 10 4 The administration of the Miranda
warnings and the defendant's waiver
of those rights were sufficient to
05
statement.
derivative
the
validate
The Elstad Court identified the factors necessary to cure a warned
confession derived from an earlier unwarned statement.' 0 6 The Court
held that "a careful and thorough administration of Miranda warnings
serves to cure the condition that rendered the unwarned statement
inadmissible."' 0 7 Comparatively, a Fourth Amendment violation triggers
the fruits doctrine and taints all derivative evidence until a sufficient
break in events neutralizes it.' 0 8 Yet, the Court concluded that this

97. See id. at 448.
98. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
99. See id. at 301.
100. See id.
101. Seeid. at318.

102. See id.
103. See Nardone v.United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939) (holding that
derivative evidence of
a Fourth Amendment violation may be admitted if it has become so attenuated from the original
violation as to sufficiently dissipate the taint).
104. See Elstad,470 U.S. at306.
105. See id. at 318.

106. See id. at309-10.
107. See id. at 310-11.
108. See Nardone, 308 U.S. at341.
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09
"break in events" test is unnecessary to cure a Miranda violation
because in any custodial interrogation setting, arming the defendant with
his rights dispels the inherent compulsion.1 1 0 If the defendant
subsequently knowingly and voluntarily waives his or her rights, courts
"'
must admit the statement under this cured statement exception.
The Elstad Court reaffirmed the prophylactic rationale behind the
Miranda warnings and determined that Miranda violations warranted
less severe consequences than constitutional violations.1" 2 The Court's
leniency toward Miranda violations relied in part on the differences
between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments." 3 Although the Court has
not clearly articulated these differences, it has noted that "[w]here a
Fourth Amendment violation 'taints' the confession, a finding of
voluntariness for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment is merely a
threshold requirement in determining whether the confession may be
admitted in evidence." '" 4 Miranda created the additional requirement
that an otherwise voluntary confession may still be inadmissible if
Miranda warnings were not administered." 5 Consequently, the Elstad
Court determined that Mirandaprovides a remedy for the defendant who
has not suffered a constitutional harm."16 In this respect, "[t]he Miranda

and sweeps more
exclusionary rule ... serves the Fifth Amendment
' 17
itself."
Amendment
Fifth
the
than

broadly
Although the failure to administer Miranda warnings constitutes a
violation of the defendant's Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination," 8 the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to apply the
traditional fruits doctrine to Miranda violations." 19 Having characterized
Miranda warnings as prophylactic, not constitutional, 20 the Court
reasoned that the fruits doctrine, a constitutional violation remedy, did

109. See Elstad,470 U.S. at 3 10-11.
110. See id. at 311; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
111. See Elstad,470 U.S. at 318.
112. See id. at 307-08.
113. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 441 (2000); Elstad,470 U.S. at 306-07.
114. Elstad,470 U.S. at 306.
115. See id. at 307.
116. See id.
at 306.
117. Id.
118. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 439; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 441-42 (1966).
119. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441; Elstad, 470 U.S. at 308.
120. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446 (1974).
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not apply. 12' Instead, the Court carved out three exceptions to Miranda's
derivative evidence
exclusionary rule, enabling the prosecution to 1use
22
previously obtained illegally in its case in chief.
C.

The Undecided Question of Derivative PhysicalEvidence

The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to address the applicability of the
fruits doctrine to physical evidence derived from unwarned statements
excluded at trial. 23 Although the Court determined that derivative
physical evidence should be admitted in New York v. Quarles, the
evidence at issue in Quarles involved a public safety concern 124 and the
defendant's statement was admitted as well. 125 The Court has not
determined whether courts should admit derivative physical evidence of
an excluded unwamed statement. 126 But, several Justices have expressed
views on the subject. 127 In Quarles, four of the Justices opined on the
context 128
admissibility of derivative physical evidence in the Miranda
129
after rejecting the majority's "public safety" exception.
In his dissenting opinion in Quarles, Justice Marshall, with whom
Justices Brennan and Stevens joined, determined that both the unwamed
statement and the derivative physical evidence must be presumed
inadmissible. 130 Justice Marshall recognized the U.S. Supreme Court's
121. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 318; New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657 (1984); Tucker, 417
U.S. at 445-46.
122. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314 (admitting a derivative, warned statement under the cured
statement exception); Quarles, 467 U.S. at 655 (admitting an unwarned statement and derivative
physical evidence under the public safety exception); Tucker, 417 U.S. at 447-48 (admitting a
derivative witness identification under the limited retroactivity exception).
123. See Patterson v. United States, 485 U.S. 922, 922-23 (1988) (White, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari); United States v. Patane, 304 F.3d 1013, 1023 (10th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Faulkingham, 295 F.3d 85, 90-91 (1st Cir. 2002).
124. See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 657-58.
125. See id. at 659-60.
126. See Patterson,485 U.S. at 922-23; Patane,304 F.3d at 1023; Faulkingham,295 F.3d at 9091.
127. See Quarles,467 U.S. at 666 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at
688 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
128. See id. at 666, 688.
129. See id. at 665 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); id. at 674 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
130. See id. at 688 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In light of Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984),
Justice Marshall concluded that the derivative evidence might be admissible if the police would
have inevitably discovered it. Consequently, he would have affirmed the Court of Appeals'
exclusion of the unwamed statement, but would remand the matter of the derivative evidence for
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31
prior extension of the fruits doctrine to the Fifth Amendment context
and reasoned that Mirandawas in fact a constitutional rule.132 Therefore,
evidence
he suggested that precedent required suppressing physical
33
statement.
unwarned
an
of
result
direct
a
as
discovered
Justice O'Connor, on the other hand, concurred in admitting the
derivative physical evidence on the ground that Miranda's exclusionary
rule was limited to testimonial evidence. 34 She reasoned that the Fifth
Amendment only prohibits compelling a suspect to disclose evidence of
a testimonial or communicative nature.1 35 Nontestimonial or physical
evidence is outside the scope of the Fifth Amendment. 36 Justice
O'Connor based this conclusion on a series of cases admitting evidence
obtained from the defendant's body. 137 Specifically, the Court has
38
upheld police action compelling defendants to provide blood samples,'

voice exemplars,

39

handwriting samples,

40

4
and speak during a lineup,' '

as not violating the Fifth Amendment. The Court reasoned that
procuring evidence from the defendant's body did not in any way
compel self-incrimination. 142 In these cases, the Court limited
testimonial evidence invoking the Fifth Amendment to an accused's
communication that explicitly or implicitly relates to a factual assertion
or discloses information. 43 Consequently, Justice O'Connor concluded
that in light of the nontestimonial evidence precedent, the non-

reconsideration in light of Nix. See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 689-90 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
131. See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 687-88 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n,
378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964).
132. See Quarles,467 U.S. at 683 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
133. See id. at 688-89 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
134. See id. at 660 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
135. See id. at 666 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
136. See id.
137. See, e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1973) (supplying voice exemplars);
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 265-66 (1967) (providing handwriting samples); United States
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 221-23 (1967) (speaking during a lineup); Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 761 (1966) (drawing blood).
138. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 761.
139. Dionisio,410 U.S. at 5-7.
140. Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 265-66.
141. Wade, 388 U.S. at 221-23.
142. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764.
143. See Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988).
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communicative nature of the derivative physical evidence 144itself
foreclosed excluding such evidence on Fifth Amendment grounds.
Ultimately, the majority in Miranda did not draw such distinctions;
instead, it created a broad exclusionary rule that evidence obtained from
a suspect without the full administration of the Miranda warnings and a
knowing and voluntary waiver should not be admitted in the
prosecution's case in chief. 45 The U.S. Supreme Court has limited the
application of Miranda's exclusionary rule in three situations. 146 In
carving out these exceptions, the Court characterized the Miranda
warnings as a prophylactic safeguard, as distinguished from a
constitutional rule.' 47 The Court has not ruled on the admissibility of
derivative 148physical evidence when the unwarned statement has been
excluded.
II.

DICKERSON V UNITED STATES: MIRANDA IS A
CONSTITUTIONAL RULE

The Dickerson decision represents the U.S. Supreme Court's break
from characterizing Miranda's requirements as prophylactic. 49 In
Tucker, Quarles, and Elstad, the Court characterized Miranda as a
prophylactic rule and used that characterization as a rationale for carving
out the three exceptions. 150 In Dickerson, however, the Court held that
Miranda was a constitutional rule.' 5' The issue before the Court was
whether Congress had the constitutional authority to supersede Miranda
when it enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3501.52 Under § 3501, admissibility of

144. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 667-68 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
145. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
146. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 314 (1985); Quarles, 467 U.S. at 655; Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447-48 (1974). These are exceptions to the exclusion of evidence in the
prosecution's case in chief. For other exceptions outside the scope of this Comment, see supra note
11.

147. See Elstad,470 U.S. at 307-08; Quarles, 467 U.S. at 653; Tucker, 417 U.S. at 446.
148. See Patterson v. United States, 485 U.S. 922, 922-23 (1988) (White, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari); United States v. Patane, 304 F.3d 1013, 1023 (10th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Faulkingham, 295 F.3d 85, 90-91 (1st Cir. 2002).
149. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437-38 (2000).
150. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 308-09; Quarles, 467 U.S. at 657; Tucker, 417 U.S. at 445-46.
151. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444.
152. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2000). Section 3501 was part of the Ominbus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat 210. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 437.
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statements made during custodial interrogation was based solely on their
voluntariness. 153 Thus, § 3501 represented a return to the pre-Miranda
voluntariness test, rejecting Miranda per se.154 If Miranda warnings
were a prophylactic safeguard, then Congress had the constitutional
authority to enact § 3501.55 If Miranda warnings were required under
the Constitution,
on the other hand, then Congress had overstepped its
56
authority. 1

This issue surfaced when the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit determined the admissibility of an unwarned custodial
statement under § 3501.15' The Fourth Circuit held that an unwarned but
voluntary confession was admissible under § 3501.158 In Dickerson, the
police arrested and interrogated the defendant in connection with a bank
robbery without administering Miranda warnings.159 At trial, the
defendant argued that his incriminating statements should be suppressed
under Miranda. 60 The trial court granted his motion to suppress.'

61

On

appeal, the Fourth Circuit ruled that while the defendant had not
received Miranda warnings, the confession was voluntary, thus meeting
62
§ 3501's admissibility requirements.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and held that Miranda's warningbased rule governing the admissibility of statements made during
custodial interrogation was a constitutional decision, which a legislative
act could not overrule. 163 The Court returned to its rationale for the
warnings in Miranda: "the coercion inherent in custodial interrogation
blurs the line between voluntary and involuntary statements, and thus
heightens the risk that an individual will not be 'accorded his privilege
under the Fifth Amendment."",164 The Court reasoned that the warnings
were constitutionally required to protect a suspect's Fifth Amendment

153. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 435-36.
154. See id. at 436.
155. See id. at 437.
156. See id.
157. See id. at 432.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See id. at 444.
164. Id. at 435 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 439 (1966)).
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rights.165 Thus, while Miranda left the door open for the legislature to
design safeguards that exceed Miranda's constitutional requirements, it
also represents the minimum constitutional standard that the legislature
166
cannot go below.
Although the Dickerson Court rejected the prophylactic rationale used
to create the three exceptions in earlier jurisprudence,167 it did not
overrule any of these cases. 168 In fact, it incorporated the prophylactic
Miranda opinions directly into its holding.169 Yet, the Court did not
explain how it reconciled the prophylactic Miranda holdings with
Miranda's "reaffirmed" constitutional status.' 70 Instead, the Court held
that Miranda's exceptions merely illustrated "that no constitutional rule
is immutable."''
In other words, because courts cannot foresee every
circumstance in which counsel will seek to apply a general rule, it is
necessary for courts to be able to modify such rules accordingly. 172 The
Court noted that these modifications are as much a part of constitutional
law as the original decision.' 73 Therefore, while the Dickerson opinion
greatly undermined the principal reasoning underlying both Tucker and
Elstad, their exceptions are still good law. 174 The Court's decision in
Dickerson, however, threw into question whether the Court would adopt
another rationale to further limit the scope of Miranda's exclusionary
rule, or whether it would use the fruits doctrine to exclude physical
evidence derived from a now constitutional Mirandaviolation.
III.

POST-DICKERSON APPLICATION OF MIRANDA TO
DERIVATIVE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE

Following Dickerson, a circuit split developed regarding the
75
admissibility of physical evidence derived from unwarned statements.
165. Id. at 439.

166. Id. at 440.
167. See id at 437-38.
168. See id. at 432.
169. See id. ("We therefore hold that Miranda and its progeny in this Court govern the
admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts.")
(emphasis added).
170. See id. at 437-38, 441.
171. Id. at 441.
172. See id.
173. See id.

174. See id. at 432.
175. See United States v. Patane, 304 F.3d 1013 (10th Cir. 2002); United States v. Faulkingham,
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The United States Courts of Appeals for the Third and Fourth Circuits
rejected the fruits doctrine in the Miranda context,1 76 and reaffirmed
their pre-Dickerson holdings that physical fruits are admissible after
excluding the unwarned statement.177 In contrast, the United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit reaffirmed its pre-Dickerson holding that
the fruits doctrine applies to intentional Miranda violations.' 78 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit went a step further
and held that the fruits doctrine applies to negligent Miranda
violations. 179
A.

Physical FruitsAre Admissible

Since Dickerson, two circuits have held that the fruits doctrine does
80
not apply to physical evidence derived from an unwarned statement.
In United States v. DeSumma,' 81 the Third Circuit refused to apply the
fruits doctrine to the physical fruits of a Miranda violation.' 82 An FBI
agent asked an arrested, unwamed defendant if he had any weapons in
his possession. 183 The defendant replied that he had a gun in his car,
which the agent subsequently found. 184 The Third Circuit held that the
gun could be admitted without violating the Fifth Amendment,
even
85
though it was obtained through a non-Mirandizedstatement.
Relying on the Dickerson Court's affirmation of the distinction
between Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations in Elstad,8 6 the Third
Circuit determined that Dickerson's characterization of Miranda as a
constitutional rule did not fatally undermine Elstad's rationale for not
applying the fruits doctrine. 87 The court focused on Elstad's
295 F.3d 85 (1st Cir. 2002); United States v. Sterling, 283 F.3d 216 (4th Cir. 2002); United States v.
DeSumma, 272 F.3d 176 (3d Cir. 2001).
176. See Sterling, 283 F.3d at 219; DeSumma, 272 F.3d at 180.
177. See Sterling, 283 F.3d at 219; DeSumma, 272 F.3d at 180.
178. See Faulkingham, 295 F.3d at 93 (citing United States v. Byram, 145 F.3d 405, 410 (1st Cir.

1998)).
179. See Patane, 304 F.3d at 1019.
180. See Sterling, 283 F.3d at 219; DeSumma, 272 F.3d at 180.
181. 272 F.3d 176 (3d Cir. 2001).
182. See id. at 180.
183. See id. at 180-81.
184. See id.
185. See id. at 181.
186. See id. at 180.
187. See id.
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determination of Miranda's exclusionary rule as sweeping more broadly
than the Fifth Amendment itself.188 The court reasoned that while
voluntary unwarned statements were excluded from evidence, "'the
Miranda presumption... does not require that the statements and their
fruits be discarded as inherently tainted.""' 8. 9 Consequently, the court
held that the fruits doctrine does not apply to Miranda violations
because the police would be no more deterred after the trial court
excludes the unwamed statement.190
Similarly, in United States v. Sterling,'91 the Fourth Circuit refused to
apply the fruits doctrine to physical evidence derived from an unwarned
statement. 92 The arresting officer asked the arrested, unwarned
defendant whether he had any weapons. The defendant stated that he had
a shotgun in his truck, which police subsequently found.' 93 The Fourth
Circuit held that the trial court properly admitted the shotgun because
94
the fruits doctrine did not extend to Fifth Amendment violations.
The Sterling court determined that Dickerson did not impact the
Fourth Circuit's earlier holding that the fruits doctrine does not apply in
a Miranda context. 95 The court reasoned that Dickerson's incorporation
of Miranda'sprogeny into its holding was evidence that "the established
exceptions, like those in Tucker and Elstad, survive."'1 96 Further, the
Sterling court suggested that Miranda'sexclusionary rule did not extend
beyond the unwarned statements made in violation of the Miranda rule,
regardless of whether Miranda was constitutional or not. 97 Therefore,
while acknowledging Miranda'sconstitutional status, the court held that
Tucker and Elstadcontinued to support its rejection of the application of
the fruits doctrine to derivative physical evidence.' 98

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

See id. at 179 (citing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985)).
Id. (quoting Elstad,470 U.S. at 307).
Seeid. at 180.
283 F.3d 216 (4th Cir, 2002).
See id. at 219.

193. See id. at 218.
194. See id. at 219.
195. See id. (citing United States v. Elie, 111 F.3d 1135 (4th Cir. 1997)).
196. Id.
197. See id.
198. See id.
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Exclusion of Derivative PhysicalEvidence Limited to Willful
Miranda Violations

Before Dickerson, the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit held that Elstad did not prevent the application of the fruits
doctrine in the Mirandacontext. 199 After Dickerson, the court reaffirmed
this position in United States v. Faulkingham,00 but limited the
application of the fruits doctrine to exclude only derivative evidence
obtained by willful violations of Miranda, not merely negligent acts.2""
In Faulkingham, the police failed to administer Mirandawarnings to the
defendant before a series of events unfolded where the police assisted
the defendant in connecting with his drug supplier.20 2 However, to
achieve that end, the arrested and unwarned defendant made
incriminating statements, which led the officers to the drug supplier,
who in turn led the officers to heroin.20 3 Because there was no evidence
that the police deliberately failed to give the warnings or did so to get
more possibly incriminating evidence, the court determined that the
20 4
Miranda violation at issue was the result of negligent police conduct.
The court held that while the fruits doctrine applied to the Miranda
context, 20 5 courts can still admit derivative evidence where the unwarned
statement was suppressed and the law enforcement
agents merely acted
20 6
negligently, not willfully or maliciously.

The Faulkingham court reasoned that Elstad did not bar the
application of the fruits doctrine because in Elstad the defendant's
warned statement, not a derivative witness or physical evidence, was at
issue. 07 Nevertheless, the court noted the Elstad Court's broad language
discouraging the use of the fruits doctrine in the Miranda context,
regardless of the nature of the derivative evidence. 20 8 Consequently, the
20 9
Faulkingham court framed a limited application of the fruits doctrine.
199. See United States v. Byram, 145 F.3d 405,410 (1st Cir. 1998).
200. 295 F.3d 85, 90-91 (1st Cir. 2002).
201. See id. at 93-94.

202. See id. at 87-88.
203. See id.
204. See id. at 93-94.
205. See id. at 90.
206. See id. at 94.
207. See id. at 90-91.
208. See id. at 91 (citing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307 (1985)).

209. See id. at 93-94.
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The court held that in the Fifth Amendment context, once the unwarned
statements are suppressed, the rationale of deterring police misconduct
becomes less primary.2 10 The First Circuit balanced the reduced
importance of the deterrence goal against the importance of the evidence
to the truth-seeking process. 21 Applying this balancing analysis, the
court concluded that derivative physical evidence is admissible
where
21 2
police negligently fail to administer Miranda warnings.
C.

Exclusion of DerivativePhysical Evidence in Negligent Miranda
Violations

Contradicting the First Circuit, the Tenth Circuit in United States v.
Patane 13 applied the fruits doctrine to physical evidence derived from a
negligent Miranda violation. 21 4 Without administering the full Miranda
warnings, the officer in Patane asked the arrested defendant about his
Glock .40 caliber pistol. 21 5 The defendant replied, "The Glock is in my
bedroom ....
6 The court determined that the police officer's conduct
was negligent and not willful, 21 7 although the court did not elaborate on

this conclusion. Ultimately the Tenth Circuit held that the firearm,
discovered as a result of the defendant's statement following the police
officer's negligent administration of Miranda warnings, must be
218
suppressed under Miranda'sexclusionary rule.
The Patane court held that Elstad and Tucker were not controlling.2t 9
The court reasoned that while these cases declined to apply the
traditional fruits doctrine of Wong Sun, their holdings were grounded on
the rationale that suppression only applies to the fruits of
unconstitutionalconduct, and "the violation of a prophylactic rule [does]

210. See id.
211. See id.
212. See id. at 94. For an example of the application of the fruits doctrine to a willful violation,
see United States v. Byram, 145 F.3d 405, 410 (1st Cir. 1998).
213. 304 F.3d 1013 (10th Cir. 2002).
214. See id. at 1023. This case represents a reversal of the Tenth Circuit rule that the physical
fruits of Miranda violations need not be suppressed. See id. (citing United States v. McCurdy, 40
F.3d 1111, 1117 (10th Cir. 1994)).
215. See id. at 1015.

216. Id.
217. See id. at 1027.
218. See id. at 1019.
219. See id. at 1023.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 78:757, 2003

not require the same remedy., 220 Because Dickerson fatally undermined
such logic in Tucker and Elstad,22' the Tenth Circuit concluded that
Tucker and Elstaddid not
foreclose the application of the fruits doctrine
222
in the Miranda context.

The Patane court also suggested that the Third and Fourth Circuits
erred in their refusal to exclude physical fruit. 223 The court criticized the

blanket bar of the fruits doctrine as having two fundamental problems. 2 4
First, the Patane court suggested that Dickerson's referral to "Miranda
and its progeny"2 25 did not foreclose suppression of physical evidence
for the simple reason that Elstad and Tucker did not involve derivative
physical evidence. 6 Second, the court suggested that Dickerson's
reaffirmation of Elstad's distinction between Fourth and Fifth
Amendment violations did not bar the application of the fruits doctrine
to Miranda violations.227 The Patane court reasoned that the difference
between the violations was in the breadth of the fruits doctrine, not in its
application.228 In other words, the court determined that the Miranda
exceptions created a narrowed fruits doctrine, not an absolute bar on the
229
doctrine itself.

Finally, the Patanecourt criticized the First Circuit's selective use of
the fruits doctrine in the Miranda context. 230 Specifically, it disagreed

with the Faulkingham court's differentiation between negligent and
willful violations of a defendant's Miranda rights. 23' The Tenth Circuit
asserted that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
was equally violated whether the police were negligent or willful in their
failure to administer the Miranda warnings. 232 Moreover, limiting the
fruits doctrine to willful violations would not vindicate the deterrence

220. Id.at 1019.
221. See id.

222. See id. at 1022-23.
223. See id. at 1027.
224. See id. at 1024.

225. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000).
226. See Patane,304 F.3d at 1024.
227. See id.at 1025.
228. See id.
229. See id.

230. See id.
at1027 (citing United States v. Faulkingham, 295 F.3d 85 (1st Cir. 2002)).
23!. See id.

232. See id.
at 1028.
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goal of the exclusionary rule.233 Relying on the subjective view of the
police officer would also make it difficult for courts to apply the
Mirandapresumption consistently.234 Instead, the Patane court held that
applying the fruits doctrine to physical fruits, regardless of the officer's
subjective intent, "provides certainty in application and clarity for the
better serves the
officers charged with operating under it [and therefore]
23 5
efficiency.,
judicial
and
officers,
interests of citizens,
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to Patane,236 and
therefore, this circuit split will soon be resolved. The circuit split
outlines three possible outcomes. If the Court agrees with the reasoning
of the Third and Fourth Circuits, derivative physical evidence will be
admitted into the prosecution's case in chief.237 On the other hand, the
Court could agree with the First Circuit and conclude that the fruits
doctrine is applicable in the Miranda context, 238 but limited to willful
violations of Miranda.239 This holding would admit physical evidence
derived from negligent Miranda violations. 240 Finally, the Court could
physical
affirm the Tenth Circuit's ruling and hold that derivative
24 1
intent.
officer
of
regardless
excluded
be
should
evidence
IV.

PHYSICAL EVIDENCE DERIVED FROM UNWARNED
STATEMENTS SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM THE
PROSECUTION'S CASE IN CHIEF

Having recently granted certiorari to United States v. Patane,242 the
U.S. Supreme Court should hold that physical evidence derived from
statements obtained in violation of Mirandashould be excluded from the
prosecution's case in chief for two reasons. First, no U.S. Supreme Court
precedent forecloses exclusion of physical evidence derived from an

233. Id. at 1029.
234. Id.

235. Id.
236. 71 U.S.L.W. 3530 (U.S. Apr. 21, 2003) (No. 02-1183).

237. See United States v. Sterling, 283 F.3d 216, 219 (4th Cir. 2002); United States v. DeSumma,
272 F.3d 176, 180 (3d Cir. 2001).
238. See United States v. Faulkingham, 295 F.3d 85, 90-91 (1st Cir. 2002).

239. See id. at 93; see also United States v. Byram,145 F.3d 405, 409-10 (lst Cir. 1998).
240. See Faulkingham,295 F.3d at 94.

241. See United States v. Patane, 304 F.3d 1013, 1029 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 71
U.S.L.W. 3530 (U.S. Apr. 21, 2003) (No. 02-1183).
242. See United States v. Patane, 71 U.S.L.W. 3530 (U.S. Apr. 21, 2003) (No. 02-1183).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 78:757, 2003

excluded unwarned statement. 243 Tucker and Elstad are distinguishable
on their facts.244 Furthermore, Dickerson undermined extending Tucker
and Elstad by clarifying Miranda's constitutional status.245
Consequently, the Third and Fourth Circuits erred in extending Tucker
and Elstad to admit the physical fruits of excluded unwarned
statements.246 Second, U.S. Supreme Court precedent directs courts to
apply the fruits doctrine to derivative physical evidence of an unwarned
statement.247 This application should not be conditioned on officer
intent.248 Anything less than an objective application of the fruits
doctrine to physical evidence would undermine the effect of Miranda's
exclusionary rule.2 49 Although the First and Tenth Circuits have
250
correctly applied the fruits doctrine to derivative physical evidence,
the First Circuit incorrectly limited its application to willful violations of
Miranda.2 1 The U.S. Supreme Court has not conditioned Miranda's
exclusionary rule or its exceptions on officer intent. 252 The Court has not
created an exception for derivative physical evidence, 253 and therefore,
courts should exclude such evidence along with the unwarned
statement.254
A.

There Is No U.S. Supreme Court Precedent Governing the
Application of the Fruits Doctrine to Derivative Physical Evidence

The U.S. Supreme Court has not decided whether the fruits doctrine
applies to physical evidence derived from unwarned statements excluded

243. See Patane, 304 F.3d at 1023; Faulkingham, 295 F.3d at 90.
244. See Patane,304 F.3d at 1024.
245. See id. at 1023-25.
246. See id. at 1024-25.
247. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 688 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Murphy v.
Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964).
248. See Palane, 304 F.3d. at 1028-29. But see United States v. Faulkingham, 295 F.3d 85, 9394 (1st Cir. 2002).
249. See Patane, 304 F.3d at 1029; cf Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966) (finding
that the protection of the Fifth Amendment outweighs any hardships the Miranda rule imposes upon
law enforcement).
250. See Patane, 304 F.3d at 1021-27; Faulkingham, 295 F.3d at 90-91.
251. See Patane, 304 F.3d at 1027-28. But see Faulkingham, 295 F.3d at 93-94.
252. See, e.g., Quarles, 467 U.S. at 656; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467, 475.
253. See Patane, 304 F.3d at 1022-23 (citing Patterson v. United States, 485 U.S. 922, 922-23
(1988) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)).
254. See id. at 1029.
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at trial.255 In New York v. Quarles, the Court created a public safety
exception to Miranda's exclusionary rule allowing the admission of
derivative physical evidence when public safety would be immediately
jeopardized by any delay in obtaining evidence.2 5 6 This public safety
exception, however, does not broadly apply to admit all derivative
physical evidence. The Court has recognized that Quarles is a "narrow
exception '257 for situations in which public safety is threatened.258
Further, the Court determined that where public safety is at issue, the
evidence is outside the scope of Miranda altogether. 259 Therefore, the
issue of whether derivative physical evidence is admissible when
Miranda does apply and the unwamed statement has been excluded
remains open.
Neither Michigan v. Tucker nor Oregon v. Elstad resolve this issue
260
because they are grounded on Miranda's former prophylactic status.
The Tucker and Elstad decisions provide two exceptions to Miranda's
exclusionary rule that allow derivative evidence to be admitted after the
court has excluded the unwarned statement. 26 The Dickerson case
fundamentally undermined these holdings by characterizing Miranda as
a constitutional decision.262 Once stripped of its prophylactic rationale,
the Tucker case exists as a unique case limited to the timing of the
interrogation and the Miranda decision.263 The Elstad rule becomes a
rule for curing derivative evidence from being excluded under the fruits
doctrine.264 The Third and Fourth Circuits erred by expanding these
exceptions to admit the physical fruits of unwarned statements.265

255. See Patterson, 485 U.S. at 922-23 (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Patane,
304 F.3d at 1023; Faulkingham,295 F.3d at 90-91.
256. See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 655.
257. See id. at 658.
258. See id. at 657-58.
259. See id. at 657.
260. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 445-46
(1974).
261. See Elstad,470 U.S. at 314; Tucker, 417 U.S. at 447-48.
262. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000).
263. See Tucker, 417 U.S. at 447.

264. See Elstad,470 U.S. at 306.
265. See United States v. Sterling, 283 F.3d 216, 219 (4th Cir. 2002); United States v. DeSumma,

272 F.3d 176, 180 (3d Cir. 2001).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 78:757, 2003

1. Tucker Is Limited to Its Facts
The Tucker decision does not control the issue of whether derivative
physical evidence should be admitted.266 The Tucker Court explicitly

declined "to resolve the broad question of whether evidence derived
from statements taken in violation of the Miranda rules must be
excluded regardless of when the interrogation took place. 2 67 Instead, the
Court rooted its holding "on a narrower ground" because of the unique
facts of the case.268 The Miranda violation at issue in Tucker occurred

prior to the Court's decision in Miranda,269 but the trial occurred after
Miranda's announcement. 270 The Tucker Court neld that because the

police did not actually violate the law while they were interrogating the
defendant, a special 27limited
retroactivity exception applied to admit the
1
derivative evidence.

Because the Dickerson Court characterized Miranda as a
constitutional rule,272 police failure to either administer Miranda
warnings or obtain an effective waiver should result in the suppression
of both the unwarned statement and its fruit, 273 unless the public safety
exception in Quarles applies.274 The Tucker Court concluded that

because Miranda warnings were merely prophylactic, violating Miranda
should not reap consequences as severe as those for a constitutional
violation.27 5 After Dickerson, this rationale has been undermined.2 76
Moreover, once the prophylactic language and conclusions are
withdrawn from the Tucker opinion, Wong Sun is controlling.277 The
Tucker Court distinguished Wong Sun on the ground that it involved a

266. See Tucker, 417 U.S. at 447.
267. Id.
268. See id.
269. See id. at 447-48.
270. See id. at 437.
271. See id. at 447-48.
272. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 438 (2000).
273. Cf Tucker, 417 U.S. at 446-47 (distinguishing the consequences of police conduct abridging
a constitutional right from police conduct departing only from prophylactic standards).
274. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 (1984).
275. See Tucker, 417 U.S. at 445-48.
276. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432.
277. Cf Tucker, 417 U.S. at 445-46 (distinguishing actual abridgement of a defendant's
constitutional rights, in which case suppression of derivative evidence is warranted, from departure
from a prophylactic standard); see also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485, 488 (1963)
(excluding verbal and physical evidence derived from a constitutional violation.
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constitutional violation whereas Miranda violations depart only from
prophylactic standards. 278 The Court therefore acknowledged that actual
constitutional violations require suppression of the fruits of that conduct
under Wong Sun.279 Thus, after a police failure to either administer the
Miranda warnings or obtain an effective waiver, both the unwarned
statement and its physical fruit should be suppressed at trial unless the
public safety exception applies.
2.

Elstad Establishedthe Rule for Curing a Miranda Violation

As an exception limited to admitting warned statements derived from
unwarned statements, 280 Elstad does not control whether derivative
physical evidence should be admitted.2 8S The ElstadCourt held that the
defendant's derivative statement should be admitted based on the
rationale that Miranda warnings are merely prophylactic safeguards
requiring a narrower exclusionary rule than the fruits doctrine applied to
constitutional violations. 82 The Court reasoned in Elstadthat Miranda's
warnings and waiver requirements swept more broadly than the Fifth
Amendment itself 283 The Court suggested that while Miranda's
prophylactic safeguards barred otherwise constitutional confessions, the
severe consequences of the fruits doctrine were inapplicable for such
non-constitutional violations. 284 However, this reasoning does not
survive after Dickerson's reaffirmation of Miranda as a constitutional
rule. The logical consequence of Dickerson's characterization of
Miranda as a constitutional decision is that the scope of Miranda's
exclusionary rule is the same as the Fifth Amendment. 285 Therefore, in
direct contrast to the Court's holding in Elstad, if law enforcement
officers fail to properly administer the Miranda warnings and obtain a
knowing and voluntary waiver from the defendant, these violations

278. See Tucker, 417 U.S. at 445-46.
279. See id; see also Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484 (determining that "[tlhe exclusionary prohibition
extends as well to the indirect as the direct products of [unlawful] invasions").
280. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985).
281. See United States v. Patane, 304 F.3d 1013, 1022 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Patterson v. United
States, 485 U.S. 922, 922-23 (1988) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)).
282. See Elstad,470 U.S. at 305-06.
283. See id. at 306.
284. Id. at 308-09.
285. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 438-40, 440 n.5 (2000).
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should "breed

the

same

irremediable

consequences

286
infringement of the Fifth Amendment itself."

as

police

Once shed of its prophylactic rationale, Elstad survives only as a
curing rule for Miranda violations,287 distinct from the Fourth
Amendment attenuation doctrine. 288 The Elstad Court based its holding
in part on the distinction between unwarned interrogation under the Fifth
Amendment and unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment.28 9
Because the evidence at issue in Elstad was in fact a Mirandized
statement, impliedly the difference between unwarned interrogation and
unreasonable searches is that the warnings and a waiver can cure a
Miranda violation. 9 ° In Elstad, the Court held that "a careful and
thorough administration of Miranda warnings serves to cure the
condition that rendered the unwarned statement inadmissible., 291 In
contrast, courts apply the attenuation doctrine to Fourth Amendment
violations to determine when derivative evidence is admissible.29 2 Under
this doctrine, unreasonable searches and seizures are not "cured" until
the connection between the illegality and the293contested evidence has
"become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.
Distinguishing the consequences of Fourth and Fifth Amendment
violations based on how or when those consequences end is reasonable.
Once police undertake a search and seizure, it is arguably impossible to
cure the initial invasion of privacy. Instead, a court must review the
proximity of the Fourth Amendment violation and the discovery of the
derivative evidence to determine whether there has been a sufficient
break to untaint the evidence. 94 Curing is easier under the Fifth
Amendment because informing a suspect of his or her Mirandarights at
any point in the interrogation process dispels the inherent compulsion of
interrogation. 295 Consequently, the potential taint from the earlier

286. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309.
287. See id. at 311.
288. See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939) (concluding that derivative evidence
may be admissible when the connection between the illegality and the evidence becomes "so
attenuated as to dissipate the taint").
289. See Elstad,470 U.S. at 306.
290. See id. at 306, 310-11.
291. Id. at 310-11 (emphasis added).
292. See Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341.

293. Id.
294. See id.

295. Cf Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
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violation to any statement made subsequent to a waiver dissipates.29 6
Under this interpretation, the difference between the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments relates to the limits of the fruits doctrine, not its
application.29 7
Dickerson reaffirmed Elstad's distinction between unreasonable
searches and unwarned interrogations. 298 However, contrary to the Third
and Fourth Circuits' interpretations,299 this reaffirmation did not provide
a blanket admission of all derivative evidence of unwarned
statements. 300 Instead, this distinction highlighted Elstad's enunciation
of a curing rule,30 1 separate from the attenuation doctrine in the Fourth
Amendment.30 2
Furthermore, Dickerson's characterization of Elstad as "refusing to
apply the traditional fruits doctrine developed in the Fourth
Amendment" 30 3 does not foreclose application of the fruits doctrine in
the Miranda context. The "traditional" fruits doctrine incorporates the
attenuation doctrine.30 4 Elstad held that this was not necessary in the
Fifth Amendment context because the administration and waiver of the
Miranda warnings prior to the statement in question sufficiently cured
the statement of illegality.30 5
On review in Patane, the Court should recognize that Miranda's
exclusionary rule would not require a curing test if the fruits doctrine
was not applicable in the Miranda context. Curing inherently recognizes
that a violation has occurred with ongoing consequences until the taint
of the violation appropriately dissipates. In the Miranda context,
dissipation occurs when warnings are administered and a waiver is
given.30 6 In the case of physical evidence derived from an unwarned
statement, however, there is no possibility of intervening warnings
between the unwarned statement (i.e., the poisonous tree) and the
296. See Elstad,470 U.S. at 311; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
297. See United States v. Patane, 304 F.3d 1013, 1025 (10th Cir. 2002).
298. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428,441 (2000).
299. See United States v. Sterling, 283 F.3d 216, 219 (4th Cir. 2002); United States v. DeSumma,
272 F.3d 176, 180 (3d Cir. 2001).
300. See Patane, 304 F.3d at 1026.
301. See Elstad,470 U.S. at 311.
302. See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
303. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441 (internal quotations omitted).
304. See Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341.
305. See Elstad,470 U.S. at 311.
306. See id.
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physical evidence (i.e., the fruit) to cure its taint. Therefore, the Court
should hold that both the unwarned statement and its physical fruit
should be excluded from the prosecution's case in chief, absent a public
safety exception.
3.

The Third and Fourth Circuits Erredin Extending Tucker and
Elstad to Exclude Derivative PhysicalEvidencefrom Miranda's
Exclusionary Rule

The Third and Fourth Circuits improperly extended Elstad and
Tucker's derivative evidence exceptions to admit physical evidence
derived from an excluded unwarned statement. 3 07 In upholding their preDickerson interpretations of Tucker and Elstad, the Third and Fourth
Circuits relied on the Dickerson decision's recognition of Miranda's
progeny and its distinction between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to
find that the Elstad and Tucker exceptions survived Dickerson.3 °8 The
courts interpreted the survival of these exceptions to mean that Tucker
and Elstad should be extended to bar the application of the fruits
doctrine to derivative physical evidence of Miranda violations.30 9 Yet,
the Tucker and Elstadcases are sufficiently
distinguishable on their facts
310
holdings.
their
to
limited
be
should
and
Further, the circuit courts failed to recognize the implications of
Miranda's constitutional status. 3 11 Although the Fourth Circuit noted
that its own pre-Dickerson characterization of Miranda as prophylactic
was no longer good law, 312 it failed to consider how this limited the
Tucker and Elstad holdings. In addition, the Third Circuit incorrectly
relied on the Dickerson decision's reaffirmation of Elstad as ground to
dismiss the constitutional argument. 3 13 This dismissive treatment of
Miranda's constitutional status does not survive the logical
3 14
consequences of Dickerson's impact on Tucker and Elstad.

307. See United States v. Sterling, 283 F.3d 216, 219 (4th Cir. 2002); United States v. DeSumma,
272 F.3d 176, 180 (3d Cir. 2001).
308. See Sterling, 283 F.3d at 219; DeSumma, 272 F.3d at 180.
309. See Sterling, 283 F.3d at 219; DeSumma, 272 F.3d at 180.
310. See supra Part IV.A.1-2.

311. See Sterling, 283 F.3d at 219; DeSumma, 272 F.3d at 180.
312. See Sterling, 283 F.3d at 219.
313. See DeSumma, 272 F.3d at 180.
314. See supra Part IV.A.1-2.
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B.

The U.S. Supreme CourtShould Hold that Both the Unwarned
Statement and Its PhysicalFruits Should Be Excluded, Regardless
of Officer Intent, to Ensure Full Protection of the Defendant'sFifth
Amendment Rights

Fifth Amendment precedent requires courts to exclude unwarned
statements and their physical fruits from the prosecution's case in chief
in order to enforce Miranda's substantive protections.31 5 Because the
fruits doctrine applies to Fifth Amendment violations, 316 it should also
apply to physical evidence derived from violations of Miranda's Fifth
Amendment safeguards.317 Furthermore, Miranda's exclusionary rule is
most effective at deterring police violations of suspects' Fifth
Amendment rights when courts exclude both the unwarned statement
and its physical fruits at trial. 318 The First and Tenth Circuits followed
Fifth Amendment precedent and applied the fruits doctrine to physical
fruit.31 9 But, contrary to the First Circuit's approach, the fruits doctrine

should not be limited to willful violations of Miranda because officer
intent is irrelevant to the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation
of Miranda.320
1.

The FruitsDoctrine'sApplication to the Fifth Amendment
EncompassesPhysical Evidence in the Post-Dickerson Miranda
Context

The Dickerson decision clarified that Miranda's warnings are
constitutionally required to protect a suspect's Fifth Amendment
rights. 32' The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the fruits doctrine
applies to the Fifth Amendment.322 A court cannot compel a witness to
make self-incriminating statements "unless the compelled testimony and

315. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 688 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Murphy v.

Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964); see also United States v. Patane, 304 F.3d 1013, 1026
(10th Cir. 2002).

316. See Murphy, 378 U.S. at 79.
317. See Quarles,467 U.S. at 688 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

318. See Patane,304 F.3d at 1026-27.
319. See Patane,304 F.3d at 1021, 1026; United States v. Faulkingham, 295 F.3d 85, 90-91, 9394 (1st Cir. 2002).
320. See Quarles,467 U.S. at 656; cf Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467, 475 (1966).
321. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 439-40,440 n.4 (2000).
322. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964).
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its fruits cannot be used" against the witness in a criminal trial.323 When
the Court extended the scope of the Fifth Amendment to encompass pretrial custodial interrogation in Miranda,324 it should have clearly
incorporated the fruits doctrine as part of the Fifth Amendment
precedent.32 5
Moreover, the Court's language in both Tucker and Elstad suggests
that the doctrine expressed in Wong Sun, "that fruits of a constitutional
violation must be suppressed," 326 controls and bars the admissibility of
physical fruits. 327 In Tucker, the Court decided that Wong Sun was not
controlling specifically because "the police conduct at issue here did not
abridge [the defendant's] constitutional privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination., 328 Once the Dickerson Court clarified that a
violation of Miranda did in fact abridge the defendant's Fifth
Amendment rights, the Wong Sun decision should control. Similarly, in
Elstad, the Court determined that the defendant's contention that the
fruits doctrine applied to his case "assumes the existence of a
constitutional violation." 329 Now that such an assumption is correct, all
evidence discovered
as a result of that violation should be excluded as
330
tainted fruit.
The U.S. Supreme Court has not carved out an exception for the
physical fruits of excluded unwarned statements,33' although some of its
opinions have used language that could reasonably lead courts to
conclude that such an exception exists. 332 In Quarles, Justice O'Connor
323. See id. (emphasis added).
324. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444; see also Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 440 n.5 (highlighting
Miranda as a Fifth Amendment rule).
325. Cf Quarles, 467 U.S. at 688-89 (Marshall, J. dissenting) (discussing the inadmissibility of
derivative physical evidence under Supreme Court precedent).
326. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 308 (1985) (discussing Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963)).
327. See id.; Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 445-46 (1974).
328. See Tucker, 417 U.S. at 445-46.
329. Elstad,470 U.S. at 305.
330. See id. at 305-06.
331. See United States v. Patane, 304 F.3d 1013, 1023 (10th Cir. 2002) (concluding that Elstad
and Tucker do not bar exclusion of derivative physical evidence); United States v. Faulkingham,
295 F.3d 85, 90-91 (1st Cir. 2002) (finding that Elstad does not "wholly bar the door" to excluding
derivative evidence).
332. See, e.g., Elstad, 470 U.S. at 304 ("The Fifth Amendment, of course, is not concerned with
nontestimonial evidence."); see also New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 666 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the Fifth Amendment's mandate "does not
protect an accused from being compelled to surrender nontestimonial evidence against himself').
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wrote a concurring opinion in which she justified admission of
derivative physical evidence on the ground that Miranda's exclusionary
rule was limited to testimonial evidence.333 Because nontestimonial
evidence falls outside the scope of the Fifth Amendment, Justice
O'Connor reasoned that the fruits doctrine could not apply to derivative
physical evidence. 334 Writing for the majority in Elstad, Justice
O'Connor again noted in dicta that nontestimonial evidence is outside
the scope of the Fifth Amendment.335
Yet, the principal flaw in equating derivative physical evidence with
nontestimonial evidence is that derivative evidence is never inadmissible
because of a defect in the manner in which it was obtained; it is excluded
336
because it is the indirect product of an earlier constitutional violation.
In other words, the constitutional violation that results in an unwarned
statement taints the derivative physical evidence-not the act of locating
the evidence itself. The inadmissibility of the derivative evidence is
grounded in the rule that the prosecution cannot profit from a
constitutional violation.33 7 The nontestimonial evidence line of cases
involved physical evidence unconnected to any constitutional
violation.338 Thus, nontestimonial evidence is outside the scope of the
Fifth Amendment strictly because the act of obtaining
the evidence does
339
self-incriminate.
to
defendant
the
not itself compel
The Court should recognize on review in Patane that Fifth
Amendment precedent excludes both the unwamed statement and its
physical fruits obtained from a Miranda violation. 340 Miranda created a
333. See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 660 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, and dissenting in part).
334. See id. at 666.
335. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 304.
336. Cf Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963) (quoting Silverthome Lumber Co.
v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920)).
337. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,443 (1984).
338. See, e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1973) (supplying voice exemplars);
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 265-66 (1967) (providing handwriting samples); United States
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 221-23 (1967) (speaking during a lineup); Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 761 (1966) (drawing blood).
339. See Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988) (defining testimonial evidence to mean
that an accused's communication explicitly or implicitly relates a factual assertion or discloses
information); see also Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765 (finding that "[r]ot even a shadow of testimonial
compulsion upon or enforced communication by the accused was involved either in the extraction
or in the chemical analysis" of the blood sample).

340. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 688-89 (1984) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting);
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964); United States v. Patane, 304 F.3d 1013,
1026 (10th Cir. 2002) (finding that a "blanket rule
barring application of the fruits doctrine to the
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presumption of inadmissibility for evidence obtained without warnings
and a waiver.341 Although the Court has created three narrow exceptions
to this rule,342 it has not created such an exception for derivative physical
evidence.343 Fifth Amendment precedent should apply to Miranda now
that the Court has recognized Miranda as a Fifth Amendment rule.344
Fifth Amendment precedent suggests that derivative physical evidence is
an unwarned statement's tainted fruit. 345 Therefore, the U.S. Supreme
Court should hold that both the unwarned statement and its physical
fruits should be excluded,
absent a public safety concern or an interim
346
warning and waiver.

2.

Applying the FruitsDoctrine to Derivative Physical Evidence Is
Necessary to Give Miranda's Exclusionary Rule Its Intended
Weight

The exclusionary rule is a harsh penalty for law enforcement officers
and prosecutors, but it is the deterrent the Court has chosen for Miranda
violations. 347 The Miranda Court concluded that society's need for
interrogation did not outweigh the constitutional privilege against selfincrimination. 348 Preventing the government from profiting from its
illegal conduct is necessary to give effect to the fundamental right
against self-incrimination. 349 Admitting the physical fruits of an
excluded statement allows the prosecution to make the same if not

physical fruits of a Miranda violation would mark a dramatic departure from Supreme Court
precedent").
341. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
342. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 308 (1985) (creating the cured statement exception);
Quarles, 467 U.S. at 657 (creating the public safety exception); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,
445 (1974) (creating the limited retroactivity exception).
343.
344.
345.
346.

See Patane, 304 F.3d at 1023.
See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437-38 (2000).
See Murphy, 378 U.S. at 79.
See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314; Quarles, 467 U.S. at 655.

347. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 481 (1966). The U.S. Supreme Court has suggested
that the principal reason for extending the exclusionary rule to fruit of the unlawful police conduct
is that "this admittedly drastic and socially costly course" is necessary to deter police from violating
suspects' constitutional and statutory rights. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442-43 (1984).
348. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479-80.
349. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 443; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479-80; cf Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 484 (1963) (discussing search and seizure).

Miranda's Poisoned Fruit Tree
"greater use 0of the confession than merely introducing the words
35
themselves."
Excluding the defendant's statement but admitting its physical fruits
creates negative incentives. It encourages the police to interrogate the
defendant so that crucial physical evidence can be discovered before
Miranda warnings are administered. 3 5' Admitting derivative physical
evidence, but not the unwarned statement, is a loophole exacting the
same "heavy toll on individual liberty" 352 as custodial interrogation did
before Miranda. Instead, the Court should exclude both the unwarned
statement and its physical fruits because this is the most effective means
for achieving the twin purposes behind Miranda's exclusionary rule:
trustworthiness and deterrence.353 First, admitting the physical fruits of
inherently compelling custodial interrogations jeopardizes the integrity
of the fact-finding process in court.354 Second, excluding the physical
fruits of an unwarned statement best deters compelled interrogations and
safeguards the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights.355 It forewarns
police officers that the prosecution bears the heavy burden of
demonstrating the suspect was warned and sufficiently waived his or her
rights before a court can admit an unwarned statement and its physical
356
fruits, thereby encouraging compliance with Miranda'ssafeguards.
3.

The First and Tenth Circuits CorrectlyApplied the Fruits Doctrine
to the Miranda Context, Although the First CircuitErredin
RestrictingIts Application to Intentional Violations of Miranda

The First and Tenth Circuits determined that in order to achieve the
goals of Miranda, derivative physical evidence must be suppressed in
certain situations.357 These circuit courts limited Elstad's application to

350. See United States v. Patane, 304 F.3d 1013, 1027 (10th Cir. 2002) (emphasis omitted); cf
Nix, 467 U.S. at 443 (reasoning that "the prosecution is not to be put in a better position than it
would have been in if no illegality had transpired").
35 1. See Patane,304 F.3d at 1026.
352. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455.
353. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447-48 (1974) (reasoning that deterrence and
trustworthiness are two justifications for the exclusionary rule); see also Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S.
298, 308 (1985) (concluding that "the absence of any coercion or improper tactics undercuts the
twin rationales-trustworthiness and deterrence-for a broader rule").
354. See Miranda,384 U.S. at 466.
355. See id.at 457-58.
356. See id. at 479.
357. See United States v. Patane, 304 F.3d 1013, 1029 (10th Cir. 2002); United States v.
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only admit warned statements following unwarned statements. 358 The
Tenth Circuit limited the holding in Tucker to apply only to derivative
evidence
stemming from violations preceding the Miranda opinion
359
itself.
While both the First and Tenth Circuits applied the fruits doctrine to
derivative physical evidence, 360 the First Circuit narrowed its application
to intentional violations only. 36 1 However, the First Circuit's reliance on
the officer's subjective intent clouds Miranda's bright-line rule
presuming exclusion unless the prosecution can demonstrate the police
properly administered Miranda warnings and the suspect waived those
rights.362 It also places courts in the position of weighing subjective
belief.363 Not only is it difficult for courts to uncover and evaluate the
subjective motivation of a police officer, but such attempts can lead to
inconsistent results.
Miranda'spresumption of exclusion reflects the reality that negligent
conduct violates a defendant's personal right against self-incrimination
to the same extent as willful conduct. 364 The Miranda Court did not
condition the compulsion of the interrogation environment on officer
intent; instead, it reasoned that only warned statements could be the
product of a defendant's free choice.365 The Miranda Court created a
severe penalty for obtaining unwarned statements to deter officers from
foregoing or undermining the defendant's rights and to ensure the
trustworthiness of admitted evidence.36 6 The Court recognized the
severity of Miranda's exclusionary rule, but held that the Fifth
Amendment required such extreme measures. 367 There is language in the

Faulkingham, 295 F.3d 85, 93 (1st Cir. 2002).
358. See Patane,304 F.3d at 1021 (discussing the exclusion of derivative evidence outside of the
Elstad facts); Faulkingham, 295 F.3d at 90-91 (same).
359. See Patane,304 F.3d at 1020 (stating that the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling rested largely on
pre-Mirandafacts).

360.
361.
362.
363.

See id. at 1019; Faulkingham, 295 F.3d at 90-91.
See Faulkingham, 295 F.3d at 93-94.
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966); Patane,304 F.3d at 1029.
Patane,304 F.3d at 1029.

364, Id. at 1028.
365. See Miranda,384 U.S. at 458.
366. See id. at 479; see also id. at 467.
367. See id.
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Court's opinion to suggest that deterrence is only achieved by
administering Mirandawarnings and adequately waiving those rights.368
The U.S. Supreme Court has also created a separate presumption that
absent an exception, evidence derived from a constitutional violation is
tainted fruit that should be excluded from court. 3 69 The Court has placed
the burden on the prosecution to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that an exception applies. 370 The Court has not created an
exception for the negligent failure to administer the Miranda warnings.
Indeed, the Court has never suggested that officer intent is relevant to
the exceptions carved out of Miranda's exclusionary rule.37' Thus, the
Court should hold that both the unwarned statement and derivative
physical evidence should be excluded from the prosecution's case in
chief, regardless of officer intent.
V.

CONCLUSION

Currently, there is a split among circuit courts regarding the
admissibility of physical evidence derived from non-Mirandized
statements. In addressing this issue, the U.S. Supreme Court should
provide a definitive answer in Patane on the admissibility of physical
evidence directly derived from unwarned statements. After reviewing
Miranda and its progeny, the Court should apply the fruits doctrine to
physical evidence obtained by negligent or willful Mirandaviolations. It
is also the most effective measure for ensuring that Miranda warnings
are properly "employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial
surroundings. 37 2 Consequently, absent an established exception, the

368. See id. at 457-58 ("The current practice of incommunicado interrogation is at odds with one
of our Nation's most cherished principles-that the individual may not be compelled to incriminate
himself. Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in
custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly
be the product of his
free choice."); id. at 467 ("In order to combat [custodial interrogation's inherently compelling]
pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the
accused must be adequately and effectively appraised of his rights and the exercise of those rights
must be fully honored.").
369. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 441-42 (1984); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 477-88 (1963); Silverthome Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
370. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 444.
371. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984) (stating that "the availability of
[the public safety] exception does not depend upon the motivation of the individual officers
involved").
372. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458.
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Court should hold that physical evidence derived from an unwarned
statement should be excluded from the prosecution's case in chief.

